Using an assurance case framework to develop security strategy and policies by Bloomfield, R. E. et al.
              
City, University of London Institutional Repository
Citation: Bloomfield, R. E., Bishop, P. G., Butler, E. & Netkachova, K. (2017). Using an 
assurance case framework to develop security strategy and policies. Lecture Notes in 
Computer Science, 10489, pp. 27-38. doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-66284-8_3 
This is the accepted version of the paper. 
This version of the publication may differ from the final published 
version. 
Permanent repository link:  http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/18331/
Link to published version: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-66284-8_3
Copyright and reuse: City Research Online aims to make research 
outputs of City, University of London available to a wider audience. 
Copyright and Moral Rights remain with the author(s) and/or copyright 
holders. URLs from City Research Online may be freely distributed and 
linked to.
City Research Online:            http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/            publications@city.ac.uk
City Research Online
Using an Assurance Case Framework to Develop Security 
Strategy and Policies 
Robin Bloomfield1,2, Peter Bishop1,2, Eoin Butler2, Kate Netkachova1,2 
1Centre for Software Reliability, City University of London 
2Adelard LLP 
{reb,pgb,eb,kn}@adelard.com 
Abstract. Assurance cases have been developed to reason and communicate 
about the trustworthiness of systems. Recently we have also been using them to 
support the development of policy and to assess the impact of security issues on 
safety regulation. In the example we present in this paper, we worked with a 
safety regulator (anonymised as A Regulatory Organisation (ARO) in this pa-
per) to investigate the impact of cyber-security on safety regulation.  
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1 Introduction 
Assurance case frameworks have been developed to reason and communicate 
about the trustworthiness of systems. Over the past five years or so we have been 
researching the impact security has on safety assurance and have been developing 
enhancements to the Claims, Arguments and Evidence (CAE) approach [1-3] to deal 
with some of the challenges posed by the need for increased rigour and complexity of 
systems. This supports the evaluation we have been doing of critical infrastructure 
security and safety e.g., [4].  
Recently we have also been using the CAE framework to support the development 
of policy. From a broader perspective we are interested in the innovation potential of 
engineering methods to support decision making in large organisations and govern-
ment [5, 6]. In the example we present in this paper, we worked with a safety regula-
tor (anonymised as ARO in this paper) to "Investigate the Impact of Cyber-Security 
on Safety Regulation". The project developed a proposed regulatory strategy to enable 
this organisation to provide an adequate response to issues of cyber-security. They 
regulate complex systems of systems and the assessment of whether systems are safe, 
and the communication of that assessment to the interested stakeholders, is not com-
plete unless security and cyber issues are taken into account.  
The interest to the assurance community is perhaps twofold: one that the frame-
works we are developing have a wider applicability to decision analysis and support 
and second that deploying approaches beyond their initial design intent can provide 
feedback on our approach to assurance cases. 
2 Impact of Cyber Security on Safety Regulation 
The project developed a proposed regulatory strategy to enable the ARO to provide 
an adequate response to issues of cyber-security. They regulate complex systems of 
systems and the assessment of whether systems are safe, and the communication of 
that assessment to the interested stakeholders, is not complete unless security and 
cyber issues are taken into account. The security aspects are increasingly important as 
there are: 
 greater levels of threats and a changing threat in terms of nature, targets and capa-
bilities of the attackers 
 significant planned changes to systems, greater connectivity and use of supply 
chains and products with vulnerabilities 
 changes in regulation 
 requirements to communicate that effective and sufficient measures have been 
taken to a variety of stakeholders 
 increased expectations of the public for a resilient service and associated systems 
To assess the impact and to develop a programme of work we worked collaboratively 
with a wide range of stakeholders to establish the complex and organisational and 
regulatory context captured what we dubbed as an “entanglement diagram” that 
showed the dependencies between the stakeholders. Having established an under-
standing of the context we used CAE to develop the visions and objectives. We con-
tinued detailing the objectives in terms of claims until these were sufficiently detailed 
to establish a programme of work. There were a complex interlocking array of issues 
and the use of the CAE provided a vehicle for reasoning and communicating with 
stakeholders (government regulatory policy experts, government security agencies, 
domain experts, regulators and assessors).  
This paper describes how we developed the vision and objectives using an assur-
ance case approach. 
2.1 Vision and Objectives 
Having established the system and regulatory context, we then developed a set of 
structured cyber-related objectives for the ARO starting from the ARO’s own strate-
gic vision, taking into account the UK Cyber Strategy, a number of cyber frameworks 
and maturity models [7-9], and a focused analysis of activities in other sectors. We 
presented the results of this analysis in terms of a set of structured objectives or 
claims so that the rationale and interaction of different parts of strategy can be ap-
praised. These are presented within a Claims Argument Evidence (CAE) framework 
and notation. The regulator was familiar with the notion of outcome-based regulation 
and the concepts of claims, arguments and evidence. 
The approach to deriving the cyber programme objectives is illustrated in Fig. 1 
(the nodes are discussed in detail later and are not meant to be legible in this figure). 
 
 
Fig. 1. Schematic of approach  
We started with the organisation’s strategic vision and then derived high-level cyber-
related objectives. We further decomposed these into more detailed objectives, identi-
fying in orange those that form the proposed cyber programme objectives, which are 
numbered sequentially. 
In developing the objectives in this way we can show traceability and rationale for 
them and also show the coverage with respect to the set of issues identified in the tree 
structure of Fig. 1 (some of the claims are outside the scope of the regulator but show 
its dependence on others). 
We have also reviewed the UK Cyber Strategy objectives and from these devel-
oped specific strategic objectives that we then mapped to the proposed programme 
objectives to show how our proposals relate to them and provided another check for 
coverage of issues. 
2.2 Deriving the Programme Objectives 
First we derive some high level objectives from the ARO strategic vision as shown in 
Fig. 2 below. 
High level objectives. The ARO’s principal functions and duties are set out in prima-
ry legislation. The ARO has a strategic vision that 
“We see a world where everyone who chooses to use these services, as well 
as those who do not, have confidence in a safe and secure sector that takes its 
responsibilities seriously, backed by a regulatory system that actively manag-
es risk and supports consistently high performance.”
"We see a world where everyone who chooses to
fly, as well as those who do not, has confidence in
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Part of this strategic vision “We see a world where everyone […] has confidence in 
a safe and secure sector […]” provides a starting point for the Cyber Strategy. We 
propose that the cyber component of this vision is interpreted as 
We see a world where there is justified confidence that cyber-security issues 
do not pose unacceptable risks to the safety and resilience of the regulated 
services 
Directly from this interpretation, we derive the top-level objective for the ARO 
Cyber Strategy in terms of the confidence in the regulated services that both the ARO 
and other stakeholders have. This is: 
There is justified confidence that the risks from cyber incidents do not pose 
unacceptable risks to the safety and resilience of the regulated services 
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Fig. 2. Deriving the ARO objectives from the vision 
ARO confidence. Starting from the claim “There is justified confidence that the risks 
from cyber incidents do not pose unacceptable risks to the safety and resilience of the 
regulated services”, we divide the top-level objective into the confidence of the ARO 
and that of other stakeholders. We propose that the objective for ARO is: 
ARO has justified confidence that cyber-security issues do not pose unac-
ceptable risks to the safety and resilience of the regulated services 
As shown in Fig. 3 below, this is then split into two sub-objectives, one describing 
the present situation and another the future. 
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Fig. 3. Confidence now and in the future 
Confidence in the present situation is then further expanded in terms of the sources 
of that confidence, which are: 
 the ARO’s own regulatory assessment activities 
 the overall regulatory approach, the institutions involved and the standards de-
ployed 
 a synthesis that all these activities when considered together show that risks from 
cyber are tolerable 
The high-level objective for the future is: 
ARO to have confidence that in the future the cyber risks will not 
undermine the safety and resilience of the regulated system 
To support this, we proposed an objective that the regulated system can deal with 
future cyber-related events and changes. These top-level objectives are summarised in 
Fig. 3 in which the key programme objectives are coloured orange. 
We now detail these objectives, moving left to right in Fig. 3. We first consider 





confidence in the security
and reslience
ARO has processes and
procedures to deliver
assessments of cyber-security
informed safety and resilience
ARO has capability to
undertake cyber roles
ARO has justified




















Fig. 4. ARO regulatory activity 
For the ARO regulatory activity to provide confidence, we identify three aspects to be 
addressed. The first two concern governance: the need for appropriate internal pro-
cesses and procedures, and confidence that ARO has the capability to undertake its 
role as a regulator of cyber-security activities. These correspond to the programme 
objectives below: 
1. ARO has processes and procedures to deliver assessments of cyber-security-
informed safety and resilience 
2. ARO has capability to undertake cyber roles 
 
Here we note that, as well as the ARO’s capability to undertake its regulatory role, 
the ARO needs to have the capability to ensure the cyber-security of its own process-
es, people and technology. Cyber-security related events within ARO, even if restrict-
ed to office systems and nothing to do with safety as such, will undermine confidence 
in the institution as a whole. The adversaries realise this, and as their overall goals 
may be to undermine confidence in the state and institutions, attacks on confidence 
and competency are a possibility, both directly and as part of multi-faceted attacks. 
There will be a need to define and adapt existing processes to deal with cyber issues, 
e.g. to define roles and responsibilities, multidisciplinary oversight and specialist 
involvement of cyber-related activities. These should address competency and the 
need for education, training and awareness. 
The third aspect to consider is the need for technical approaches for security-
informed safety and resilience. This corresponds to the next programme objective: 
3. ARO has defined technical approaches for addressing cyber-security-informed 
safety and resilience 
As shown in Fig. 4, these need to support the audit and assessment of Safety Man-
agement Systems (SMS) and Security Management Systems (SeMS), the assessment 
of resilience, and the cyber informed review of safety case changes. 
These technical approaches need to take into account that cyber-security issues im-
pact safety assurance and associated risk analyses throughout the system and service 
lifecycle, with associated changes needed from requirements through development 
and operation to disposal. The impact varies with the nature of the systems and the 
extent to which they are already engineered to be trustworthy. Many safety critical 
components will already have had a high degree of assurance applied to them and this 
needs to be reviewed and augmented from a cyber perspective. Less critical systems 
may have minor safety significance, but due to potential connectivity, they may need 
substantial reengineering and analysis to address security concerns. We provided 
details of technical approaches to cyber-security informed assessment, vulnerabilities, 
standards, systemic risks and interdependencies and the need to respond to the faster 
tempo that security issues may demand.  
Returning to the decomposition in Fig. 3, the second objective that "ARO has con-
fidence in the overall regulatory approach, the institutions involved and the standards 
deployed" is detailed by considering the sources of confidence in overall regulation. 
This is formalised as the fourth programme objective: 
4. ARO has confidence in the overall regulatory institutions and standards 
















Fig. 5. Sources of confidence in regulation and standards 
The confidence that the overall cyber-related risks are tolerable.is based on the 
regulatory oversight and engagement with the regulated institutions and service pro-
viders, and the evaluations that the ARO undertakes itself, i.e. 
 
5. ARO confident that the composition of all the activities addresses security and re-
silience of the regulated system as a whole and are proportionate 
Confidence in the future safety and resilience. Next, we elaborate the “future” 
branch of Fig. 3 where we define the following programme objective. 
 
6. ARO has justified confidence that the regulated system can deal with cyber-related 
events and changes 
As shown in Fig. 6 below this goal is elaborated in terms of the different types of 
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Fig. 6. Ability to deal with future cyber-related events 
Some of these, such as vulnerability discovery and new threats, can be considered 
as changes to the environment, while others are changes to the regulated systems 
themselves and other innovations and changes to connectivity that redefine what “the 
system” actually is. There can also be institutional and legal changes that introduce 
different stakeholders or change the roles, and lastly there will be attacks, incidents 
and accidents that may have a cyber component.  
Incident reporting and subsequent learning from experience is an important part of 
achieving safety. The tempo and changing nature of the cyber threat makes this par-
ticularly critical, and the recognition that failures may occur means that resilience and 
recovery in particular need to be addressed. An important component of a Cyber 
Strategy is therefore incident reporting and response: it is an important part of the UK 
Cyber Strategy and the development of the UK National Cyber Centre. 
Supporting other stakeholders. We now return to the second part of Fig. 2 which 
considers confidence that other stakeholders have in the regulated system and ser-
vices. We propose that ARO have responsibilities and objectives here as well as being 
an authoritative source of confidence for some stakeholders, e.g. the public. We pro-
pose a programme objective that 
 
7. ARO provides other stakeholders with confidence in the regulated systems’ securi-
ty and resilience 
We propose that the objective be achieved by communicating the ARO’s confi-
dence in the system and actively managing sources of actual and perceived risks. This 
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Fig. 7. Supporting other stakeholder confidence 
Maintaining confidence in the ARO and for the ARO to discharge its role in support-
ing the confidence in the sector will need communication as an explicit part of the 
strategy. This communication should explain the effectiveness and the reasons why 
there should be confidence in the regulated systems. It should address internal com-
munication within the industry to provide a cyber aware and knowledgeable culture 
and importantly it should provide expertise, either directly or in support of other 
spokespeople, to allow accurate reporting of cyber issues. We have already seen the 
need for effective communications where claims are made about cyber vulnerabilities. 
3 Analysis Results and Follow-up 
The CAE-based analysis led to a structured set of objectives for the Cyber Strategy 
that are summarised in Table 1 below. 
Table 1. Proposed objectives of ARO cyber programme 
Programme Objectives
1. ARO has processes and procedures to deliver assessments of cyber-security-
informed safety and resilience 
2. ARO has capability to undertake cyber roles 
3. ARO has defined technical approaches for addressing cyber-security-informed 
safety and resilience 
4. ARO has confidence in the overall regulatory institutions and standards 
5. ARO confident that the composition of all the activities address security and re-
silience of the regulated system as a whole and are proportionate 
6. ARO has justified confidence that the regulated system can deal with cyber-
related events and changes 
7. ARO provides other stakeholders with confidence in the regulated systems’ se-
curity and resilience 
To support the ARO we provided an analysis of some of the challenges that this 
programme needs to address: 
 cyber-informed safety assurance 
 resilience 
 vulnerabilities 
 systemic risks and interdependencies 
 awareness, training and education 
 incident response and organisational learning 
From this we developed a set of issues and recommendations to address these 
issues, and related them to the programme objectives. We developed a preliminary 
regulatory maturity model to explain and structure the programme of work and to put 
into context the challenge: achieving these seven objectives. We combined the 
programme objectives with levels of our maturity model to define an indicative high-
level plan. To do this we expanded on the recommendations from our analyses of the 
challenges to define the steps needed to go from the current “start-up” or “formative” 
maturity level of the regulated system with respect to cyber, to an “established” level.  
4 Discussion and Conclusions 
The role of the safety regulator is complex and the work highlighted the complexity 
and interconnectedness of the organisations involved, captured in an entanglement 
diagram. The issues that need to be addressed are also many and interlocking and the 
development and use of CAE as a presentation and reason framework helped tackle 
this complexity and provided a vehicle for reasoning and communicating with stake-
holders (government regulatory policy experts, government security agencies, domain 
experts, regulators and assessors). 
As shown above, we used the CAE Blocks [3] as a structuring mechanism. These 
were presented informally without side conditions. For decomposition blocks the 
names of the block is followed by the type of argument e.g. “decomposition by the 
sources of doubt” to indicate we were decomposing by these sources. The validity of 
the decomposition was assessed by stakeholder review and workshops. We also pro-
vided more succinct descriptions of some nodes to improve legibility and communica-
tion aspects: a balance has to be made between preciseness of claim and how this is 
described on a graphical canvas. The usage of the CAE Blocks is shown in Table 2. 
Table 2. Usage of CAE Blocks 
Blocks Usage
Concretion 1 use. Stakeholder preferred “interpretation” to “concretion”.
Substitution 1 use. “Not posing unacceptable risks” is substituted by 
“dealing with cyber events and changes”.
Decomposition A variety of uses: by types of stakeholder, sources of confi-
dence (3), sources of doubt (1), aspects of role, aspects of 
delivery (2), now and future (2).
Evidence  
incorporation 
In later part of project not reported here.
Calculation Not used.
 
In terms of directions and future work, we hope to publish the maturity model that 
supports the definition of the detailed programme of work and we would like to apply 
the approach to different regulator in different domains. The usage of CAE Blocks 
provides some indications of what might be provided by more domain specific or 
instantiated blocks for this type of application. From a broader perspective our work 
can be seen as a part of a wider initiative to see how engineering methods can be used 
“off label” to support decision making in industry and government. 
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